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,t 
DATED this \2- day of January 2009. 
For the Supreme Court 
rnldw ILm 
Stephen W. Kenyon, ~ l e #  
the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
) AUGMENT RECORD AND KEEP 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
CURTIS GLENN HARTSHORN, 
CC: Counsel of Record 
Defendant-Appellant. ) Bomeville County District Court Nos. 2006- District Court Clerk 
) 5769 (2006-143271 2006-1723612006-19594) Court Reporter Jack Fuller 
Court Reporter Tom McMinn 
A MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD AND MOTION TO KEEP SUSPENSION OF 
BRIEFING SCHEDULE IN PLACE with attachment was filed by counsel for Appellant on 
November 24,2008. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD be, and 
hereby is, GRANTED and the District Court Reporter shall prepare and lodge the transcript listed 
below with this Court within twenty-eight (28) days of the date of this Order and the District Court 
Clerk shall immediately serve counsel and file the transcript with this Court. Any corrections shall 
be filed with this Court as provided by I.A.R. 30.1 : 
I 1. Transcript of the February 12, 2008, hearing on Appellant's Motion to Withdraw his 
plea in Bonneville County Case No. CR-2006-19594. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the augmentation record shall include the documents 
listed below, items which were NOT submitted with this Motion and not contained in this record on 
appeal, and the District Court Clerk shall submit to this Court the requested documents at the same 
time as the transcript listed above: 
;. Court Minutes from the February 12, 2008, hearing on Appellant's Motion to Withdraw 
his plea in Bonneville County Case No. CR-2006-19594; and 
'2. The district court's March 20, 2008, Memorandum Decision denying Appellant's 
''dotion to Withdraw his plea in Bonneville County Case No. CR-2006-19594. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that proceedings in this appeal shall remain SUSPENDED 
until the transcript and the requested documents listed above are filed with this Court, at which time 
the due date for filing Appellant's Brief shall be reset. 
AUGMENTATiON RECORD 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 




CURTIS GLENN HARTSHORN, 1 
Defendant-Appellant. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
AUGMENT THE RECORD 
Supreme Court Docket No. 339 14-2007 
(3391 5-200713391 6-200713391 7-2007) 
Bonneville County District Court Nos. 
2006-5769, 2006-14327,2006- 17236, 
2006- 19594 
I A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT 
I THEREOF was filed by counsel for Appellant on June 12,2009. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD be, 
and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed below, 
file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
1. Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea (CR-06- 19594), file-stamped October 1, 2007; 
2. Minute Entry (CR-2006- 19594), dated February 12,2008; 
3. Order Re: Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea and Objection to Memorandum 
Decision (CR-2006- 19594), file-stamped March 20, 2008; and 
4. Memorandum Decision Re: Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea and Objection to 
Memorandum Decision (CR-06- 19594), file-stamped March 20, 2008. 
DATED this zf:ay of June 2009. 
ll 
11 
For the Supreme Court 
V I 
Stephen W. Ken 
cc: Counsel of Record 
/ ,
111 111 
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DEC 2.7 2007 
STATE APPELLATE 
iH D I . T ~ U O ~ ~ P E W ~ - K  PUBLIC DEFENDER 
STATE 0FZb4m 1 
PlaintifUPetitioner, 1 CASE NO. -+A - 0 & - / g g 9 4  
(Full name and prisoner number. ) 
1 
Befeiidant/Iiespondenr(s), 
(Full name(s). Do not us et. al.) 
1 
. - -- .- .- - - - . - . .. 1 . .. \ . - - . . - .. - - -- - -. . - . . - . . .- -. -- - - 
6. /&a COMES NOW, && plaintiff-circle one) in the above 
entitled 
AIFOkD P e  -PP-I 
Revised 10/24/05 
1 2 / 2 7 / 2 0 0 7  0 9 : 2 9  FAX 2 0 8 5 2 9 1  B O N N .  C T Y  J U V E N I L E  
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Revised 10/24/05 
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eJ& mn.d& A +k$Uf2&- 
Respectfully submitted this 2 9 % ~  of &- 2 0 a .  
Plaintif A efenda circIe one) 
CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ' 2 ~ % a ~  of q & 3  .20&? , I 
 nailed a true and correct copy of the GJ>!%.A?--&~ D ~ y i a  
. . . - - - . V . - - .- - . . - . - . 
prison mail system for processing to the U.S. mail system to: 
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5urnma?y Report 
I L.  Moore 
During a pat down of M r .  Hartshorn there were eevera l  drivers l i c e n e e e  and a U.S. Bank deb i t  card belonging 
to  other people loca ted  on h i s  parson.  Upon contacc with Cheryl Bmvcrland the  owner of t h e  dobit card1 she 
sdviwcd she hed given the ca rd  t o  a friend of here by the name of K.C. Wheeler to use to dell iterne on EBAY 
over a ysa r  sgo. Cheryl advieed the  friend had access t o  a computer a' American Auto, ( i t  muec be noted 
thac C u r t i a  Harrghorn ie lieted ee the owner of m e r i c a n  AUCO f n  ILEADS). Cheryl cold m e  that Wheeler Cold 
her  t h a t  Amcrioan Auro had bean broken i n t o  and her card @as acolen  o u t  of the safe Chat had bean i n  t h e  
bueinesa. Cbcryl s a i d  t h a t  csrd was used for numerous f raudulent  charges on t h e  I n t e r n a r  in which she  f i l e d  
Summary : . 
on 10/26 /aoo6 I had received rrnonymoue ihformation t h a t  Curtis Qlenn Hartehorn was a t  In t e rmta te  ~ a c y c l i n g  
locatad  3755 North Yellowetone i n  B o m e v i l l e  County. I wae avara t h a t  M r .  Hartehorn had warrants  for h i e  
arreet (refer to case r e p o r t  2006-06309) .  Deputy Byington ahd nyeel f  rtaponded to I n e c r s t a t e  ~ e ~ ~ c l i n g .  1 
conracted Mr. Hartshorn juec i n s i d e  t h e  fonc door of the  b u e i n e e e .  I rcoognized h i m  be Curtie Qlenn 
Harcaharn (hs ham been a cluspect ip sevef.al copper wlrs  t h e f t  caret3 T have bean working) I e a i d  t o  him, - . . -  
'how are you doing hr .  Hartahornu. M r .  Hartehorn denied t h a t  he wae in f a c t  M r .  Hartehorn. I rwpli ined t o  
him t h a t  I knaw he  was i n  fact Mx. Xartahorn and aeksd f o r  h i e  identification. M r .  Harte n s t a r t e d  to F proceed cowarde t h a  back of tha  buainees loca tad  co the  norm. ( I  had bean i n  t he  bua sea before and knaw 
t he re  was  a back~door  t o  t h e  businees). Deputy Byington had taken a p o e i t i o n  o u t s i d e  t o  t h e  back 0C the  
businaea ae we had concern8 t h a t  M r .  Hartshorn would t r y  Po run  from us. X attempted t o  con tac t  Deputy 
Byington on my portable r a d i o  to n o t l f y  him of M r .  Hatteharn'e movemente, the b a t t e r y  on my r a d i o  rraa dend. 
M r .  Hartnhorn dttampced t o  t r y  an opan t h e  overhead door but  i t  wae secured .  A t  that: time Deputy ByingCon 
had came ins ide  the  bueinees and shouted t o  Hartshorn. M r .  Wartehorn ~ u r n e d  and t r i a d  t o  r u n  towards the 
f r o n t  of the  buaincse. Deputy Byingron and myself rare a b l e  t o  atap i n  h i e  way ahd M r .  Hartshorn e topptd  
and then walked around a p a l l e t  t h a t  contained staoks of red colored  ihsulaced copper wire. M r .  Hartshorn 
picked up one of the piecee of the wire ,  which was approximately five t6 ~ l i x  f e e t  i n  l eng th .  ( I  later 
learned that t h e  w i r e  he picked up weighed eighteen pounde). M r .  Hartshorn held t he  rLre  over h i s  shoulder  
( l i k e  someone holdihg a baseball b a t  preparing t o  swing), i n  a t h rea t en ing  manner towarde us.  Both ~ e p u t y  
Byington and myself .ordered Mr. Hartshorn severa l  timas t o  drop t h e  w i r e  and g e t  an cha ground i n  which he 
- . . - . - - 
wauld noc com~-~'1-6~FTb-l373f;-'B~rEeEorn--~r h d-a--vlartanr-f or - -h i -~-ar ras  t . and. we-.conb-hued-.toot e1.I-him.. to  
drop tho objec t .  M r .  Hartshorn s t a r t e d  t o  walk towards Deputy Byington e t i l l  holding t h e  wire i n  a 
threa tening manner. M r .  Hartrhorn stopped and then s t a r t e d  t o  walk around the  p a l l e t  i n  my d i r e c t i o n  still 
holding the wire over  h i e  shoulder. I f e l t  i~ m y  mind chat Mr. Harrshorn was trying t o  decide which o f f i c e r  
t o  t r y  and at tack .  X bad my hand on my weapon and etarced t o  draw my weapon ou t  of my h o l e t a r  and backed up 
co keep distance between ue still order ing  M r .  Harcahorn to  drop the  o b j e c t .  Peputy Byington had cold  Mr. 
H a r t ~ h o t n  tha t  he wae going co use pepper Bpray on him. Mr. Hartehorn s t i l l  r e fused  a l l  o rde r s  t o  drop the 
ob jec t .  Deputy Byington eptayed M r .  hartshorn i n  che face  with peppsr  apray.  A f t e r  s eve ra l  eecondn M r .  
Hartshorn dropped the  o b j e c t ,  s t i l l  r e f u e h g  ordere t o  g e t  down on the  ground and place h i s  hand8 behind 
h i o  back. n t  thak time Deputy C.  9miCh arrlved and took M r .  Hartshorn t o  t h e  ground and was able t o  g e t  M r .  
Hsrtehorn'e arms behind h ie  back. I placed handcuff0 on him and double locked them. nn arnhulancm was c a l l e d  
to r r t a t  M r .  Hartahorn for t he  pepper rrptay and a l a o  M r .  Hartshorn had complained of a p r i o r  iajury ha had 
t o  h i e  hand. M r .  Hartehorn was t r e a t a d  by the  ambulance and then t r anspor t ed  EO che hoap i t a l  t o  have h i s  
hand looked a t .  
L 4 
Printed ot: 10/31R006 06:23 
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IN THE DISTFUCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTNCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




1 Case No. CR-2006-19594 
CURTIS GLENN HARTSHORN, 1 
) 
) 






This matter came on for hearing on defendant's Objection & Verified Motion for 
Disqualificatioil with Cause and Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea on February 12, 2008 at 9:30 
A.M., before the Honorable Gregory S. Anderson, District Judge, sitting in open court at Idaho 
Falls, Idaho. 
Ms. Karen Konvalinlta, Court Repoi-ter, and Ms. Lettie Messick, Deputy Court Clerk, 
were present. 
Mr. Randolph Neal appeared 011 behalf of the State. 
The defendant appeared by telephone on his ow11 behalf. 
The Coui-t noted that the defendant's nlotion for disqualification was resolved. 
Mr. Hartshom presented argument supporting his request for credit for time served. Mr. 
Neal argued in opposition to defendant's request for credit. Mr. Hartshorn presented additional 
argument sul~poi-ting the motion. 
The Court took the matter under adviseinent. 
Mr. Hai-tshorn presented argument suppoi-ting his illation to withdraw his guilty plea. Mr. 
MINUTE ENTRY - 1 
Neal argued in opposition to defendant's motion. Mr. Hartshorn presented additional argument 
supporting defendant's motion to withdraw guilty plea. 
The Court took the inatter under advisement. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
c: Prosecutor 
CL~-tis Hal-tshoril 
) 2,- 04- 
GREGORY S. ANDERSON 
District Judge 
MINUTE ENTRY - 2 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JtJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY BONNEVZLLE "3 'Ghb ldR23 a,, .- 
' N " .  IS 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
P 1 aint iff, 
ORDER RE: MOTION TO 
-vs.- WITltllDRAW A L F O D  PILEA AND 
1 OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM 




This cause having come before this Court pursuant to Hartshorn's October 1, 
2007, Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea and October 16,2007, Objection to the Court's 
September 20.2007, Memorandum Decision (motion for reconsideration), and this Court 
being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing; 
NOW, THEREFORE: 
Hartshorn's motion to withdraw Aljbrd plea is denied. 
Hartshorn's motion for reconsideration is denied. 
+h 
DATED this 2 day of March 2008. 
* .a.  




ORDER RE: MOTION TO WITHDRAW ALFORD PLEA AND OBJECTION TO 
MEMORANDUM DECTSTON - I. 
04/30; 008 '19: 0 7  FAX 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE * 
I hereby ccrtity that on this 2 0  day of March 2008,1 did send a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the 
correct postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse 
mailbox; or by causing the same to be hand-delivered. 
Curtis Glenn Hartshorn 
ISCI Unit 14 
Post Office Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
Bonneville County Prosecutor's Office 
605 N. Capital Ave. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County, Idaho 
ORDER RE: MOTION TO WITHDRAW ALFORD PLEA AND OBJECTION TO 
MEMORANDUM DECISION - 2 
. . 
B -- . 
THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DIS?&Q~ OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF B O ~ E V ~ ~ U ~ ~ ~  , 
7 7$-'3 r,+ 
BoQaJ' !:, a; 7, c;? . J: i s  
[ r , . q  -*<+{. ,3;,?@r 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 ' F  Co .,d F&,,C 
1 
L~~ Y Case No. CR-06- 19594 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: 
-vs.- 1 MOTION TO WITHDRAW ALFORD 
) PLEA AND OBJECTION TO 
CURTIS GLENN HARTSHORN, 1 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1 
Defendant. 1 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On December 18, 2006, Curtis Hartshorn was sentenced in Cases No. CR-2006- 
5769 for delivery of a controlled substance, CR-2006-14327 for escape, CR-2006-17236 
for issuing a check without funds and CR-2006-19594 for grand theft. Each case is 
unrelated to the others. 
In Case No. CR-2006-5769, the court revoked probation and inlposed the origillal 
0 sentence of a three-year determinate tenn followed by an indeterminate tern1 of seven 
sentence is subject to 321 days credit for time served prior to sentencing. 
In Case No. CR-2006-14327, the court sentenced Hartshorn to a one-year 
term to be served consecutively to the sentence in Case No. CR-2006-5769. 
is subject to 1 13 days credit for time served prior to sentencing. 
k In Case No. CR-2006-17236, the Couit sentenced Hartshorn to a determinate term 
of three years to be served concurrently with the sentence in Case No. CR-2006-5769 
The sentence is subject to 113 days credit for tiine served prior to sentencing. 
In Case No. CR-2006-19594, the Court sentenced Hartshorn to a n~inimuil~ tenn 
of four years to be followed by an indeternlinate term of eight years. The sentence is to 
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: MOTlON TO WITHDRAW ALFORD PLEA AND 
OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM DECISION - 1 
be served concurrently with the sentences in Cases No. CR-2006-5769 and CR-2006- 
17236. The sentence is subject to 1 13 days credit for time served prior to sentencing. 
On September 13,2007, Hartshorn filed an identical motion for credit for time 
served in each of the listed cases. 
On September 20,2007, the court entered a Menlorandurn Decision Re: Motions 
for Credit for Time Served, which denied Hartshorn's motions. 
Hartshorn filed a Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea on October I ,  2007. 
On October 16, 2007, Hartshorn filed an Objection and Verified Motioil for 
Disqualificatio~l WICause objecting to the September 20,2007, Memorandum ~ecis ion. '  
11. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION 
A. Motion to Withdraw AZford Plea 
The decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea rests in the 
discretion of the trial court. State v. Dye, 124 Idaho 250, 253, 858 P.2d 789, 792 (Ct. 
App. 1993). 
B. Motion to Reconsider 
"The decisioil to grant or deny a request for recoilsideration generally rests in the 
sound discretion of the trial court." Jordon v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592. 21 P.3d 908, 
914 (2001); Carnell v. Barker* Manuger~zent, Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 329, 48 P.3d 65 1, 658 
(2002). 
I An Order for Self Disqualification was entered on October 3. 2007 by Judge Tinge)!. On October 10, 
2007, Judge Anderson was assigned this case. Consequently, Hartshorn's Motion for Disqualification is 
moot and need not be addressed in this decision. Hartshorn's Objection appears to be a ]notion for 
reconsideration and will be handled as such by this Court. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: MOTION TO WITHDRAW ALFORD PLEA AND 
OBJECTION TO MEMOR4NDUM DECISION - 2 
111. DISCUSSION 
A. Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea 
Rule 33(c) of the Idaho Criminal Rules provides: 
Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea of 
guilty may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of 
sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after 
sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the 
defendant to withdraw defendant 's plea. 
(Emphasis added). 
1. Voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently 
a. Voluntary Plea 
Hartshorn argues his Alford plea was not vol~mtxily entered. He states: "The 
defendant stated several times that he wasn't guilty of the charge of grand theft. The plea 
was not made volui~tary and the defendant didn't have the full uilderstanding of nature of 
the act." M. to Withdraw Alford Plea at 2. He also states: "The defendant was not told 
by counsel the severity of the consequences of being sentenced that day." M. to 
Withdraw Alford Plea at coiltinued page 3. 
"Manifest injustice will be found if the plea was not taken in compliance with 
constitutional due process standards, w l ~ i c l ~  require that a guilty plea be entered 
voluntarily, lulowingly, and intelligently." State v. HufJinan, 137 Idaho 886, 857, 55 P.3d 
879. 850 (Ct. App. 2002). The defendant bears the burden of deinonstrating he should be 
allowed to withdraw t11e plea. State v. Dye, 124 Idaho 250, 254, 858 P.2d 789, 793 (Ct. 
App. 1993). 
MEI\4ORANDUM DECISION RE: MOTION TO MrITHDRAW ALFORD PLEA AND 
OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM DECISION - 3 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has explained: 
Before accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must satisfy itself that 
the plea is offered voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The plea must 
be entered with "a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its 
consequence." In Idaho, the trial court must follow the minimum 
requirements of I.C.R. 1 l(c) in accepting pleas of guilty. If the record 
indicates the trial court followed the requirements of I.C.R. 1 I (c), this is a 
prima facie showing that the plea is voluntary and knowing. The 
defendant then has the burden of persuasion to demonstrate a manvest 
injustice by establishing that the plea was induced by misapprehension, 
inadvertence or ignorance. 
State 1). Hayes, 138 Idaho 761,765, 69 P.3d 181, 185 (Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis added). 
Rule 1 1 (c) of the Idaho Criminal Rules provides: 
Acceptance of Plea of Guilty. Before a plea of guilty is accepted, the 
record of the entire proceedings, including reasoilable inferences drawn 
therefrom, must show: 
(1) The voluntariness of the plea. 
(2) The defendant was informed of the consequences of the plea, 
includiilg minimum and maximum punisllments, and other direct 
coilsequeilces which may apply. 
(3) The defendant was advised that by pleading guilty the 
defendant would waive the right against con~pulsory self-incrimination, 
the right to trial by jury, and the right to confiont witnesses against the 
defendant. 
(4) The defendant was inforined of the nature of the charge against 
the defendant. 
(5) Whether any pronlises have been made to the defendant, or 
whether the plea is a result of any plea bargaining agreement, and if so, the 
nature of the agreement and that the defendant was informed that the court 
is not bound by any promises or recommendation from either paity as to 
punishment. 
During the December 4, 2006, arraignment, the Court participated in the 
following dialogue with Hartshorn and his attorney, Jeron~y Stafford: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: MOTION TO WITHDRAIV ALFORD PLEA AND 
OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM DECISION - 4 
Judge St. Clair: And in the 19594 case, you're charged with grand theft 
in count one and aggravated assault in count two. If you're convicted of 
the grand theft, you could be sentenced from one to fourteen years in 
prison, fined up to $5,000 and required to pay restitution. If you're 
convicted of count two, you could be sentenced up to five years in prison, 
$5,000 fine and restitution. All of these may require a contribution of $50 
to the victim's relief fund. And if you're convicted of more than one count 
the sentences could be consecutive. Do you understand those potential 
penalties for conviction of any of these charges in these cases? 
Hartshorn: Yes, I do. 
Judge St. Clair: Mr. Hartshorn did you get a copy of the inforination in 
these three cases that describes the charges? 
Hartshorn: Yes, I did. 
Judge St. CIair: Did you read the infornlations? 
Hal-tshorn: Yeah, I did. 
Judge St. Clair: You have the right to have me read them to you out loud 
here in court. Would you like me to read them? 
Hartshorn: No, sir. 
Judge St. Clair: And in Case 19594 how do you plead to grand theft Mr. 
Hartshorn? 
Hartshorn: Guilty. 
Judge St. Clair: And the state is going to dismiss Ag Assault, is that 
right? 
Larren Covert: Yes, your honor 
Judge St. Clair: We'll put it down a not guilty plea in that charge. So did 
you read and sign this plea agreement Mr. Hai-tshorn? 
Hartshorn: Yes, I did. 
Judge St. CIair: Did you read it? 
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Hartshorn: Yes. 
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand it? 
Hartshorn: Yes. 
Judge St. Clair: Do you have any questions? 
Hartshorn: No. 
Judge St. Clair: This has a sentencing recon~mendatioil that the sentences 
be concurrent except the escape which must be consecutive and that the 
state would recominend six months fixed on escape. Do you understand 
that? 
Hartshorn: Yes, I do. 
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand that the state's recomn~endation as to 
sentencing would not be binding on me as to the proper punishment in 
these three cases? 
Hartshorn: Yes. 
Judge St. Clair: You understand that if I did not go along with the state's 
recommendation and gave you more severe sentences, you could not 
withdraw your guilty pleas and go to trial? 
Hartshorn: Yes sir, I do. 
Judge St. Clair: Mr. Hartshorn, are you on probation or parole? 
Hartshorn: Yes, I am. 
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand that a conviction in any of these cases 
would be a violation of that probation or parole? 
Hartshol-n: Yes, sir. 
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand that you could have your parole 
revoked and your probation revoked as a result of more convictions in 
these cases? 
Hartshorn: Yes, sir. 
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Judge St. Clair: Are you under the influence of any alcohol or any drugs 
at this time? 
Hartshorn: No. 
Judge St. Clair: Do you have mental or psycl~ological problems that have 
a bearing on these cases? 
Hal-tshorn: No. 
Judge St. Clair: Did anybody pressure you into entering into any plea 
agreement? 
Hartshorn: No. 
Judge St. Clair: Are you pleading guilty freely and voluntarily? 
Hartshorn: Yes. 
Judge St. Clair: Is anybody forcing you to plead guilty? 
Hartshorn: No. 
Judge St. Clair: Did anybody promise you I would be easy on you if you 
pleaded guilty? 
Hartshorn: No, sir. 
Judge St. Clair: Did anybody promise you I would put you on probation 
if you pleaded guilty? 
Hartshorn: No. 
Judge St. Clair: Did anybody threaten you or people close to you to inalte 
you plead guilty? 
Hartshorn: No 
Judge St. Clair: Other than the plea agreement, did anyone offer you ally 
rewards of any kind? 
Hartshorn: No, sir. 
Judge St. Clair: Are you pleading guilty to these crinles based on your 
own free will and without pressure or influence from anybody 
whatsoever? 
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Hartshorn: Yes, sir. 
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand that before sentencing I will have a 
pre-sentencing investigation completed resulting in a written report with 
your prior criminal record. 
Hartshorn: Yes. 
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand I will consider that at time of 
sentencing? 
Hartshorn: Yes. 
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand that by pleading guilty to these 
crimes you are giving up several very important constit~~tional rights, 
including the right to a jury trial on each of these crimes? The right to 
confront and cross-examine the state's witnesses and the right to call your 
own witnesses under oath? 
Hartshorn: Yes. 
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand you will have to give up your 
privilege against self-incrin~inatio and give me the factual basis of these 
three crimes? 
Hartshorn: Yes. 
Judge St. Clair: Do you still wish to plead guilty? 
Hartshorn: Yes, I do. 
Judge St. Clair: Alright, then I find that you do understand the nature of 
these three crimes to which you have pleaded guilty. I find that you 
~lnderstand the coilsequences of these guilty pleas. I find there is a factual 
basis for each of the three guilty pleas. I find that they were fieely and 
volulltarily made. I will accept the three guilty pleas. . . . 
Transcribed by Court. 
The plea agreement, signed by Hartshorn, stated: 
c. I understand that the crime of Grand Theft is a Felony, and is 
punishable as follows: 
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i. Imprisonment in the coullty jail for a term up to fourteen 
years; 
ii. A fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000); 
iii. Restitution; or 
iv. Any combination of fine, imprisonment, and restitution as 
listed above. 
Plea Agreement at 3.  
During the arraignment, Judge St. Clair complied with all the requirements of 
I.C.R. 1 l(c). The Court's dialogue with Hartshorn during the arraignment provides a 
prima facie showing that Hartshorn7s Alford plea was voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently made. Hartshorn acknowledged in the plea agreement that he was aware of 
the maximum sentence for Grand Theft. Hartshorn has not submitted any evidence that 
would indicate his plea was induced by misapprehension, inadvertence or ignorance. 
Therefore, Hartshori~ has not rebutted the prinla facie showing that his Alford plea was 
voluntarily, lulowingly and intelligently made. 
b. Persistent Violator Charge 
Hartshori~ appears to argue his Alford plea was coerced. He states: "The 
defendant, in the above mentioned cause, after pre-trial discussions with the defense 
lawyer and prosecuter, was told that if he didn't plead guilty to grand theft he was to be 
charged with the persistent violator." M. to Withdraw Alford Plea at 2. 
In Stone 1). State, 108 Idaho 822, 824-25,702 P.2d 860, 862-63 (Ct. App. 1985), 
the Idaho Court of Appeals held: 
Stone . . . alleges that the prosecutor threatened to charge Stone as 
an habitual offender and represented that an additional twenty-six counts 
could be filed in federal court if he did not plead guilty. Stone, however, 
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does not allege that these additional charges were groundless, only that 
they were not filed. It is clear from the record that Stone was aware his 
prior felony convictions made it possible for him to be charged by the 
state as a persistent violator and to receive a life sentence. See I.C. tj 19- 
2514. He thus does not contend that the prosecutor's conduct was 
fraudulent. A prosecutor is at liberty to use the availability of filing 
additional, legitimate charges as a bargaining chip in plea negotiations. 
"A guilty plea induced by a prosecutorial ... promise to refiain froin filing 
additional charges does not necessarily vitiate an otherwise voluntary 
plea." State v. Swindell, 93 Wash.2d 192, 607 P.2d 852, 855 (1980). 
"Defendants advised by competent counsel and protected by other 
procedural safeguards are presuinptively capable of intelligent choice in 
response to prosecutorial persuasion, and unlikely to be driven to false 
self-condemnation." Bordenkircher I). Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363, 98 S.Ct. 
663, 668, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978). Stone admits his counsel was present 
when the "threats" were made. He does not allege any other facts which 
would cast a shadow on the voluntariness of his guilty plea. Stone was 
thus "pres~unptively capable of intelligent choice in response to 
prosecutorial persuasion." He has therefore not alleged facts which, even 
if true, would entitle him to relief. See Cooper v. State, supra. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has also stated: 
[Tlhere is a certain amount of coercion inherent in charging a defeildant 
and bringing him before the court to declare his guilt or innocence. 
During plea bargaining, there is little chance of coilstitutionally excessive 
coercion, however, so long as the defendant is free to accept or reject the 
prosecutor's offers. 
Gar-zee 17. State, 126 Idaho 396, 399, 883 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Ct. App. 1994). 
The prosecutor in this case was free to use the "threat" of a persistent violator 
charge as a persuasive tool when negotiating the plea bargain with Hartshorn. Hartshoin 
was represented by counsel and protected by various procedural safeguards. He was free 
to accept or reject the prosecutor's offers. Hartsl~orn's Alford plea is, therefore, presuined 
to have been entered voluntarily. 
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2. Factual basis inquiry 
Hartshorn argues the court's acceptance of his plea was improper because the 
court "did not inquire fully to the facts of the charge." M. to Withdraw AlJbrd Plea at 
continued page 2. 
The Idaho Coui-t of Appeals has explained that with an Alford plea, not only must 
the plea be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made, but a fourth requirement must 
also be met: 
[A]n accused may voluntarily consent to the inlposition of a piison 
sentence despite a professed belief in his or her innocence, as long as a 
factual basis for the plea is demonstrated by the state, and the accused 
clearly expresses a desire to enter such a plea. In Idaho, there is no 
general obligation to inquire into the factual basis of a guilty plea. 
However, such an inquiry should be made if an Alford plea is accepted, or 
if the court receives information before sentencing which raises an 
obvious doubt as to guilt. 
An~erson v. State, 11 9 Idaho 994, 996, 812 P.2d 301, 303 (Ct. App. 1991) (citations 
omitted). 
During the December 4, 2006, arraignment, the Court inquired into the factual 
basis of the grand theft charge against Hartshorn: 
Judge St. Clair: And how about the last case-this grand theft charge. 
What happened there? 
Hnrtshorn: I had my business. It was when I first started my business. A 
guy that was working with me; I needed to get some stuff off the iilterilet 
and sell them. Supposedly his girlfriend's mother, which I've never met 
her, got a debit card. I paid 330 or 350 bucks. Ordered what I needed to 
order and that was all it was used. I got burglarized and we thought that 
that was stolen too. The card was supposed to have been just used the one 
time and then I was told it wasn't ally good after that. Well, anyway I had 
it in my safe and they stole my safe, so I figured that was gone with it. 
Later when we nloved out of the shop I found it. I put it in my wallet and 
that's where it's been. I don't know. I've been in and out of jail four or 
five times in the last year and nobody ever said anything until this time. 
h4EMORANDUM DECISION RE: MOTION TO WITHDRAW ALFORD PLEA AND 
OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUh4 DECISION - 1 1 . 
Stafford: Your honor, on this one we should probably do Alford, I think. 
He's disputing that he stole it, but the owner of the card is claiming that 
she didn't give him permission that to use it or have it so it's kind of a 
factual dispute. I think he's agreeing to plead guilty for the benefits of this 
plea agreement, getting the other charges dismissed, and due to the risk at 
trial with her coming in and saying that he didn't have permission to have 
it. 
Judge St. Clair: Is that right Mr. Hartshorn? 
Hartshorn: Yes, sir. 
Judge St. Clair: And so you think that this Cheryl Beverland that she 
would be testifying against you with respect to this particular card? 
Hartshorn: I guess so. She said it happened a year ago. It's been inore 
like two-and-a-half years ago. 
Judge St. Clair: But you had it? You had her card in your wallet? 
Hartshorn: Yes, I did. 
Judge St. Clair: MTheil you were here in Idaho Falls, Idaho? 
I-Iartshorn: Yes. 
Judge St. Clair: On October 26, 2006? 
Hartshorn: Yes. 
Judge St. Clair: You didn't have any permission from her to have her 
card in your wallet? 
Hartshorn: No. 
Transcribed by Court. 
The Court's inquiry into the factual basis for the grand theft charge against 
Hai-tshonl was sufficient to establish a basis for Hartshorn's Alford plea. 
3. Specific Intent 
Hartshoril argues he was never "told that the state had the burden of proving 
intent." M. to Withdraw Alford Plea at continued page 3. He cites State v. Henderson, 
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1 13 Idaho 41 1,744 P.2d 795 (Ct. App. 1987), in support of his argument that he should 
have been informed that the state had the burden of proving intent. In Henderson, the 
defendant argued the trial court erred when it denied his motion to withdraw guilty plea. 
Henderson based his motion to withdraw guilty plea on the grounds he had not been 
infoimed, prior to entering the guilty plea, that the state needed to prove specific intent as 
an element of grand theft. The Court of Appeals stated: 
Before accepting a guilty plea, the court must satisfy itself that the 
plea is offered voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. I.C.R. 1 l(c); 
Fowler v. State, 109 Idaho 1002, 712 P.2d 703 (Ct.App.1985). A 
voluntary plea cannot be made without disclosure to the accused of the 
intent element of a specific intent crime. Sparrow v. State, 102 Idaho 60, 
625 P.2d 4 14 (1 98 1); Fowler v. State, supra; State v. Vasquez, 107 Idaho 
1052,695 P.2d 437 (Ct.App. 1985). 
We must examine the record of the proceedings at which the guilty 
plea was taken and the record of prior proceedings to determine whether 
the accused was adequately informed of the specific intent element. . . . 
. . . Grand theft is a specific intent crime. . . . 
As we have shown, the information itself did not specifically 
inelltion an intent to deprive or an intent to defraud. It did not allege that 
He~ldersoil knew or had reasoil to know that the cashier's checks were 
false and forged and would not be paid when presented. Nothing in the 
record shows that, when the guilty plea was entered, Henderson had been 
told that if the case went to trial the state would have to prove the specific 
illtent and knowledge required for a conviction under this statute. What 
Henderson's trial counsel may have told Henderson about elenlents of 
proof or possible defenses is not shown. 
Id. at 4 12-41 3, 744 P.2d at 796-97. The coui-t held Heildersoil must be permitted 
to withdraw his guilty plea. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION IIE: MOTION TO WITHDRAW ALFORD PLEA AND 
OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM DECISION - 13 
In this case, the State filed an amended information accusing Hartshorn of Grand 
Theft on November 28,2006. The amended information reads: 
COUNT I, GRAND THEFT, Felony 
I.C. $5 18-2403,18-2407(1)(b)3 
The defendant, CURTIS GLENN HARTSHORN, on or about October 26, 
2006, in Bonneville County, State of Idaho, did wrongfully take, obtain, or 
withhold a financial transaction card from the owner, Cheryl Beverland, 
with the intent to deprive the owner of such property or to appropriate the 
same to himself. (1 4 years, $5, OOOfine, and restitution.) 
(Underlined emphasis added). 
During the December 4, 2006, arraigiul~ent, Hartshorn and Judge St. Clair 
engaged in the following dialogue: 
Judge St. Clair: Mr. Hartshorn did you get a copy of the illformatioil in 
these three cases that describes the charges? 
Hartshorn: Yes, I did. 
Judge St. Clair: Did you read the informations? 
Hartshorn: Yeah, I did. 
Judge St. Clair: You have the right to have me read them to you out loud 
here in court. Would you like me to read them? 
Hartshorn: No, sir. 
Unlike in Henderson, Hartshorn was advised by the specific language of the 
amended illforillation that intent was a required element of grand theft. Consequently, his 
Alfol-d plea was made voluntarily, lcnowingly and intelligeiltly 
B. Motion to Recoiisider 
Hartshorn filed an objection to the Coui-t's September 20, 2007, Meinorailduin 
Decisioil Re: Motions for Credit for Time Served. This Court assumes Hartshorn intends 
his objectioil as a motion for reconsideration. In support of his Motion for Credit for 
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Time Served, Hartshorn cites State v. Hernandez, 120 Idaho 785,  820P.2d 380, for the 
proposition that a defendant who receives credit for time served on one cllarge should be 
credited with an equal amount of time served on all other charges being served 
concurrently with the first charge. Hartshorn states: 
If ail sentences are running concurreilt except for the escape 
charge, shouldn't I get 321 days jail credit on all charges that run 
concurrent to my original sentence? The consecutive one year fixed for 
escape with 11 3 days to begin after the original sentence imposed is how it 
should be. 
Aff. of Defendant at attaclment #2. Hartshorn appears to be arguing that he should 
receive 321 days credit on Cases No. CR-06- 17236 and CR-06-19594. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals addressed this issue in State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 
67, 122 P.3d 1167 (Ct. App. 2005). In Vasquez, the defendant was arrested for 
possession of a controlled substance in Payette County. One month later, Vasquez was 
served with an arrest warrant from Washington County while still incarcerated in Payette 
County. Vasquez was seiltenced in Payette County on July 10, 2003. On the same day, 
Vasquez was transpol-ted to Washington County and arraigned on the charges pending 
against hiin there. He was seilteilced in Washington Couilty on August 1 1, 2003. The 
Washington County sentences were ordered to run concurreiltiy with the Payette County 
sentence. Vasquez received credit for the thirty-two days he served in Washiilgton 
County on the Washington County sentence. He filed a inolion for credit for time served 
arguing that because the sentences were ordered to run concurrentiy, he was entitled to 
prejudgment credit on his Washingtoil County sentence for the time served in Payette 
Cou11ty. 
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The court in Vasquez stated: 
The award of credit for time served is governed by I.C. 5 18-309 
which provides in part: 
In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom 
the judgment was entered, shall receive credit in the judgment for 
any period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such 
incarceration was for the offense or an included offense for which 
the judgment was entered. 
The statute's phrase "if such incarceration was for the offense or 
an included offense for which the judgment was entered" means that the 
right to credit is conferred only if the prejudgment incarceration is a 
consequence of or attributable to the charge or conduct for which the 
sentence is imposed. State v. Horn, 124 Idaho 849, 850, 865 P.2d 176, 
177 (Ct.App. 1993); Hale, 1 16 Idaho at 765, 779 P.2d at 440. Thus, there 
must be a causal effect between the offense and the incarceration in order 
for the incarceration to be "for" the offense, as the term is used in I.C. 5 
18-309. 
Id. at 68, 122 P.3d at 1 168 
The J/asquez court distinguished Hernandez, explaining: 
There is a distinction between the defendant in Hernandez and the 
defendant in Horn and Vasquez, namely that Hernandez was charged in 
one county under one multi-count indictment, whereas Vasquez and Horn 
were charged for crimes in different counties on separate c,o~nplaints for 
unrelated acts. When charges are concurrently filed, the prejudginent 
incarceration is caused by each charge. On the other hand, when the 
charges are not concurrently filed but rather brought by different 
complaints for unrelated charges in separate counties, the iilcarceration is 
not a coilsequence of all charges even if the sentences are subsequently 
ordered to run concui~ently. In sl~ort, a defendant wroilgfully receives 
duplicative credit for prejudgment incarceration when the iilcarceration is 
credited to each concurrent sentence but is attributable to oilly one charge 
and not the other. 
. . . [Tlhe fact that Vasquez was given the benefit of concurrent sentences 
does not mean that he gets the additional benefit of prejudgillellt 
incarceration attributable to a completely separate crime committed in 
another county. 
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Id. at 69, 122 P.3d at 1 169. 
In this case, Hartshorn pled guilty and was sentenced on four unrelated charges. 
His prejudgment incarceration in Cases No. CR-06- 17236 and CR-06- 19594 was not 
related to his prejudgment incarceration in Case No. CR-06-5769. The Cotu-t gave 
Hartshorn the benefit of allowing him to serve his time for the three separate cases 
concurrently. Hartshorn is not, however, entitled to apply the credit he received for time 
served only under Case No. CR-06-5769 to Cases No. CR-06-17236 and CR-06-19594. 
I-Iartshorn also argues Vasquez is distinguishable from his case because Vasquez 
was charged in different counties, whereas he was charged only in Bonnevilie County. 
Hartshorn nlisinterprets Vasquez. The focus of the court's holding in Vclsqziez 
was that a defendant does not receive the benefit of credit for time served on concurrent 
sentences when his prejudgment iilcarceration for one of the charges was "attributable to 
a completely separate crime." The fact Vasquez's charges were filed in separate couilties 
is not relevant. The fact the charges in Hartshorn's cases were brought by different 
coinpiaiilts and for unrelated charges provides the basis for application of the Vasquez 
decision in this action. 
The Court's Septeinber 20, 2007, memorandum decision correctly denied 
Hal-tshorn's motions for credit for time served. Hartshorn's motion for reconsideration 
should be denied. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Hartshorn's motion to withdraw Alford plea should be denied. 
Hartshorn's motion for reconsideration should be denied. 
.v 
DATED this 'Z 0 day of March 2008. 
&jiAq#, -A .o- 
GREGORY S. ANDERSON 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this & day of March 2008, I did send a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing documeilt upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the 
correct postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse 
mailbox; or by causing the same to be hand-delivered. 
Curtis Glenn Hartshorn 
ISCI Unit 14 
Post Office Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
Bonneville County Prosecutor's Office 
605 N. Capital Ave. 
Idaho Fails, ID 83402 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 
Boruleville County, Idaho 
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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
AUGMENT RECORD AND KEEP 
SUSPENSION OF BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
IN PLACE 
Supreme Court Docket No. 33914-2007 
(33915-2007133916-2007133917-2007) 
Bonneville County District Court Nos. 2006- 
5769 (2006-143271 2006-1 723612006-1 9594) 
A M-OTION TO AUGMENT RECORD AND MOTION TO KEEP SUSPENSION OF 
BRIEFING SCHEDULE IN PLACE with attachment was filed by counsel for Appellant on 
November 24,2008. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD be, and 
hereby is, GRANTED and the District Court Reporter shall prepare and lodge the transcript listed 
below with this Court within twenty-eight (28) days of the date of this Order and the District Court 
Clerk shall immediately serve counsel and file the transcript with this Court. Any corrections shall 
be filed with this Court as provided by I.A.R. 30.1 : 
' 1. Transcript of the February 12, 2008, hearing on Appellant's Motion to Withdraw his 
plea in Bonneville County Case No. CR-2006-19594. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the augmentation record shall include the documents 
listed below, items which were NOT submitted with this Motion and not contained in this record on 
time as the transcript listed above: - 
I. Court Minutes from the February 12, 2008, hearing on Appellant's Motion to Withdraw 
his plea in Bonneville County Case No. CR-2006-19594; and 
' 2 .  The district court's March 20, 2008, Memorandum Decision denying Appellant's 
"dotion to Withdraw his plea in Bonneville County Case No. CR-2006-19594. 
~ 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that proceedings in t h s  appeal shall remain SUSPENDED 
until the transcript and the requested documents listed above are filed with this Court, at which time 
the due date for filing Appellant's Brief shall be reset. 
appeal, and the District Court Clerk shall submit to this Court the requested documents at the same 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




j Case NO. CR-2006-19594 
1 
1 MINUTE ENTRY 
) 




This matter came on for hearing on defendant's Objection & Verified Motioll for 
Disqualification with Cause and Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea on February 12, 2008 at 9:30 
A.M., before the Hoilorable Gregoi-y S. Anderson, District Judge, sitting in open court at Idaho 
Falls, Idaho. 
Ms. Karen Konvaliillta, Court Reporter: and Ms. Lettie Messick, Deputy Court Clerk, 
were present. 
Mr. Randolph Neal appeased on behalf of the State. 
The defendant appeared by telephone on his ow11 behalf. 
The Coui-t noted that the defendant's illation for disqualification was resolved. 
Mr. Hartshom presented argument suppol-ting his request for credit for time served. Mr. 
Neal argued in opposition to defendant's request for credit. Mr. Hai"c11om presented additional 
arguille~lt suppoiting the motion. 
The Court took the matter under advisement. 
Mr. Hartshorn presented argunlent supporting his ~llotion to withdraw his guilty plea. Mr. 
hlINU1'E ENTRY - I 
Neal argued in opposition to defendant's motion. Mr. Hal-tsllom presented additional argulllellt 
su~pgorting defendant's motion to withdraw guilty plea. 
The Court took tlle matter under advisement. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
rL -p7 2,. C=dYl.&l&:3L 
GREGORY S. ANDERSON 
District Judge 
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THE DISTRJ+Cl' COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
I O- Q 
OF IBARO, IN AND FOR THE COLJNTY OF BQNNEVLLE-1 - 
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1 STATE OF IDAHO. - L c,, ,',;*G ,'Q r 
1 Case No. CR-06- 19594 
k" /J 
Plaintiff. 1 
1 RTEMORANDUM DEClSION RE: 
-vs.- 1 MOTION TO WITHDRAW ALFORD 
1 PLEA AND OBJECTION TO 
CURTIS GLENN HARTSHORN. 1 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1 
Defendant. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On December 18. 2006. Curtis Hal-tsholll was se~ltellced in Cases No. CR-2006- 
5769 for delivery of a colltrolled substa~lce, CR-2006- 14327 for escape, CR-2006- 1 7236 
for issuing a check without funds and CR-2006-19594 for grand theft. Each case is 
unrelated to the others. 
In Case No. CR-2006-5769, the court revolted probation and inlposed the original 
selltellce of a tlu-ee-year deter~ninate tern1 followed by an indeterminate term of seven 
years. The sentence is subject to 321 days credit for time served prior to sentencing. 
In Case No. CR-2006-14327, the court selltellced Hartshorn to a one-year 
deterlllillate term to be served collsecutively to the se~ltellce in Case No. CR-2006-5769. 
The selltellce is subject 10 1 13 days credit for time served prior to sentencing. 
In Case No. CR-2006-17236, the Court selltellced Hartshorn to a determinate term 
of t h e e  years to be served collcurrelltly with the sentence in Case No. CR-2006-5769. 
The sentence is subject to 113 days credit for time served prior to sentencing. 
In Case No. CR-2006-19594, the Court selltellced Hartshorn to a minin~um term 
offour years to be follou~ed by an illdetermillate tell11 of eight years. The sellte~lce is to 
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be served concurrently with the sente~lces in Cases No. CR-2006-5769 and CR-2006- 
17236. The se~ltellce is subject to 1 13 days credit for time served prior to sentencing. 
On Septenlber 13, 2007, Hartshorn filed an identical nlotioll for credit for time 
serlled in each of the listed cases. 
On September 20, 2007, the court entered a Men1orandu1l.l Decision Re: L4otions 
for Credit for Time Served, which denied Hartshorn's motions. 
Hal-tshosn filed a Motion to V\Tithdraw Alford Plea on October 1. 2007. 
On October 16, 2007, Hartshorn filed an Objection and Verified h4otion for 
Disqualification WICause objecting to the Septenlber 20, 2007, Menloralldunl Decision.' 
11. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION 
A. Motion to Withdraw AIford Plea 
The decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea rests in the 
discretion of the trial court. State v. Dye, 124 Idaho 250, 253, 858 P.2d 789, 792 (Ct. 
App. 1993). 
B. Motion to Reconsider 
"The decision to grant or deny a request for recollsideratio~l generally rests in the 
sound discretion of the trial court." Jordan I). Becks, 135 Idaho 586, 592, 21 P.3d 908, 
914 (2001): Cnrnell I, Barker Mnnageme17t, h e . ,  137 Idaho 322, 329. 48 P.3d 651, 658 
(2002). 
I An Order for Self Disqualificatio~~ was entered on October 3. 2007 by Judge Tinge).. On October 10, 
2007, Judge Anderson was assigned this case. Consequently, Hartshoin's Motion for Disqualificatio~~ is 
moot and need not be addressed in this decision. Hartshorn's Objection appears to be a motion for 
reconsideration and will be handled as such by this Court. 
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111. DISCUSSION 
A. Motion to Withdraw Alforrl Plea 
Rule 33(c) of the Idaho CI-iminal Rules provides: 
V4ithdrawal of Plea of Guilty. A nlotio~l to withdraw a plea of 
guilty may be made only before sentence is inlposed or imposition of 
sentence is suspended; hut io c o ~ ~ ~ - e c t  nzu17ifesf inj~tsiice /he COUI-I  affer 
se~zlence mujl set aside tlie jztd,onzei7/ of  conviction und yem7ii [he 
deferzdunt to ~lithdraw~ defendant 's plea. 
(Emphasis added). 
1. Voluntarily, knowingly and intelligentlj~ 
a. Voluntary Plea 
Hal-tshorn argues his A(fo1.d plea was not voluntarily entered. He states: "The 
defendant stated several times that he wasn't guilty of the charge of grand theft. T l~e  plea 
was not made voluntary and the defendant didn't have the full understa~lding of nature of 
the act." M, to Withdram7 Alford Plea at 2. He also states: "Tlle defendant was not told 
by cou~lsel the severity of the consequences of being se~lte~lced that day." h4. to 
Nrithdraw Alford Plea at coilti~lued page 3. 
"Manifest injustice will be found if the plea was not taken in complisu~ce with 
constitutio~lal due process standards, mihich require that a guilty plea be entered 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." State v. Huffinan, 137 Idaho 886, 887, 55 P.3d 
879, 850 (Ct. App. 2002). Tlle defendant bears the burden of demonstrating he should be 
allowed to withdram7 the plea. Stare I). Dye, 124 Idaho 250, 254, 858 P.2d 789, 793 (Ct. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: MOTION TO WITHDRAW ALFOXD PLEA .4ND 
OBJECTION TO h4Eh40FUNDUM DECISION - 3 
The Ida110 Court of Appeals has explained: 
Before accepting a guilty plea, the trial court nlust satisfjl itself that 
the plea is offered voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The plea nlust 
be entered with "a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its 
consequence." In Idaho, the trial court nlust follow the ~ni~l imu~l l  
requirenlents of I.C.R. I 1 (c) in accepting pleas of guilty I f  the I-ecord 
ind~cates tlze trial cozn.t.follo~~~ed the requirenle17t~ o f  I C R 11 (c), tl7is is a 
pri111a facie showling tl~al thc yleu is ~)oIuntaly nnd know777g The 
defendant ~ I T C M  I7as the bzn-den of yers~lusio17 to demor7sirate u 177anifesi 
rlzjz~stice by establrshing tlzui ihe plea was ilzdz~ced by 177isapyrei7el7~1on, 
inah)ertence or zgnoralzce 
Stare I!. Hayes, 138 Idaho 761, 765, 69 P.3d 181. 185 (Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis added). 
Rule 1 1 (c) of the Idaho Crinlinal Rules provides: 
Acceptance of Plea of Guilty. Before a plea of guilty is accepted, the 
record of the entire proceedings, i~lcluding reasonable i~lferellces drav,a 
therefrom, nlust show: 
(1) The volu~ltariness of the plea. 
(2) The defendant was informed of the consequences of the plea, 
including ~nininiulll and ~naxinlu~n punishments, and other direct 
consequences which may apply. 
(3) The defendant was advised that by pleading guilty the 
defenda~lt would waive the right against con~pulsory self-incrimination, 
the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront witnesses against the 
defendant. 
(4) The defendant was informed of the nature of the cl~arge against 
the defendant. 
(5) Whether ally pronlises have been made to the defendant, 01. 
whether the plea is a result of any plea bargaining agreement, and if so, the 
nature of the agreement and that the defendant was inforlned that the court 
is not bound by any promises or reconvllendatioll from either party as to 
punislul~ent . 
During the December 4, 2006, ara igment ,  the Court participated in the 
following dialogue with Hartshorn and his attorney, Jeromy Stafford: 
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Judge St. Clair: And in the 19594 case, you're charged 1vit11 grand theft 
in coullt one and aggravated assault in count two. If you're convicted of 
the grand theft, you could be sentenced from one to fourteen years in 
prison, fined up to $5.000 and required to pay restitution. If you're 
comlicted of coulll two, you could be selltellced up to five years in prison, 
$5,000 fine and restitution. All of these may require a contributio~l of $50 
to the victim's relief fund. And if you're convicted of more than one count 
the sentences could be consecutive. Do you ullderstand those potential 
penalties for co~lvictio~l of ally of these charges in these cases? 
Hartshorn: Yes, I do. 
Judge St. Clair: Mr. Hartshorl did you get a copy of the illfor~natioll in 
these t h e e  cases that describes the charges? 
Hartshorn: Yes, I did. 
Judge St. Clair: Did you read the infornlations? 
Hartshorn: Yeah, I did. 
Judge St. Clair: You have the right to have me read them to you out loud 
here in court. Would you like me to read them? 
Hartshorn: No, sir. 
Judge St. Clair: And in Case 19594 how do you plead to grand theft Mr. 
Hartshor~~? 
Hartshorn: Guilty 
Judge St. Clair: And the state is going to disnliss Ag Assault, is that 
right? 
Larren Covert: Yes, your honor. 
Judge St. Clair: We'll put it down a not guilty plea in that charge. So did 
you read and sign this plea agreement Mr. Ha~-tshorn? 
Hartshorn: Yes, I did. 
Judge St. Clair: Did you read it? 
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Hartshorn: Yes. 
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand it? 
14artsho1-n: Yes. 
Judge St. Clair: Do you have any questions? 
Hartshorn: No. 
Judge St. Clair: This has a sentencing reconullendatioll that the sentences 
he concurrent except the escape which must be consecutive and that the 
state would recolllnlend six montl~s fixed on escape. Do you ullderstand 
that? 
Hartshorn: Yes, I do. 
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand that the state's recommendation as to 
sentellcillg would not be binding on me as to the proper punishment in 
these t h e e  cases? 
Hartshorn: Yes. 
Judge St. Clair: You understand that if I did not go along with the state's 
recon~nlelldation and gave you more severe sentences, you could not 
withdraw your guilty pleas and go to trial? 
Hartshorn: Yes sir, I do. 
Judge St. Clair: Mr. Hastshorn, ase you on probation or parole? 
Hartshorn: Yes, I an1 
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand that a convictioll in any of these cases 
would be a violation of that probation or parole? 
Hartshorn: Yes, sir. 
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand that you could have your parole 
revoked and your probation revolted as a result of more convictions in 
these cases? 
Hartshorn: Yes, sir 
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Judge St. Clair: Are you under the influence of any alcol~ol or any drugs 
at this time? 
Hartshol-n: No. 
Judge St. Clair: Do you have melltal or psycl~ological problems that have 
a bearing on these cases? 
Hartshorn: No. 
Judge St. Clair: Did anybody pl.essure you into entering into any plea 
agreement? 
Hartshorn: No. 
Judge St. Clair: Are you pleading guilty fieely and voluntxily? 
Hartshorn: Yes. 
Judge St. Clair: Is anybody forcing you to plead guilty? 
Hartshorn: No. 
,Judge St. Clair: Did anybody promise you I would be easy on you if you 
pleaded guilty? 
Har-tshorn: No, sir 
Judge St. Clair: Did anybody promise you I would put you on probation 
if you pleaded guilty? 
Hartshorn: No. 
Judge St. Clair: Did anybody threatell you or people close to you to make 
you plead guilty? 
Hartshorn: No. 
Judge St. Clair: Other than the plea agreement, did anyone offer you ally 
rewards of any ltind? 
Hartshorn: No, sir. 
Judge St. Clair: Are you pleading guilty to these crinles based on your 
own free m7ill and ~ ~ i t h o u t  pressure or i~lfluellce fiom anybody 
whatsoever? 
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Hartshorn: Yes. sir. 
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand that before sentellcing I will have a 
pre-sentencing investigation conlpleted resulting in a written report with 
your prior crinlinal record. 
Hartshorn: Yes. 
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand I will consider that at time of 
sentencing? 
Hartshorn: Yes. 
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand that by pleading guilty to these 
crinles you are giving up several very impel-tan1 constitutio~lal rights, 
including the right to a jury trial on each of these crimes? Tlle right to 
confront and cross-examine the state's witnesses and the right to call your 
own witnesses under oath? 
Hartshorn: Yes. 
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand you will have to give up your 
privilege against self-incrimination and give me the factual basis of these 
t h e e  crimes? 
Hal-tshorn: Yes. 
Judge St. Clair: Do you still wish to plead guilty? 
Hartshorn: Yes, I do. 
Judge St. Clair: Alright, then I find that you do understand the nature of 
these t h e e  crimes to which you have pleaded guilty. I find that you 
understand the consequences of these guilty pleas. I find there is a factual 
basis for each of the three guilty pleas. I find that they were freely and 
voluntarily made. I will accept the three guilty pleas. . . . 
Transc,ribed by Court. 
The plea agreement, signed by Hartshorn, stated: 
c. I understand that the crime of Grand Theft is a Felony. and is 
punishable as follows: 
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i. I~nprisolune~lt in the county jail for a term up to fourteen 
years; 
ii. A fine of not lllore than five thousa~ld dollars ($5,000); 
iii. Restitution; or 
iv. Any combination of fine, imprisolul~ent, and restitution as 
listed above. 
Plea Agreement at 3. 
During the al-raig~ullent, Judge St. Clair complied with all the requirelnents of 
1.C.R. I 1 (c). T11e Court's dialogue with Nartshorn during the an-aiglunent provides a 
prima facie showing that Hartshorn's Alfo7.d plea was \loluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently made. Hal-tshorn acknowledged in the plea agreement that he was aware of 
the maximum selltellce for Grand Theft. Hartshorn has not sublnitted any evidence that 
would indicate his plea was induced by misapprehension, inadvel-tence or ignorance. 
Therefore, Hal-tshonl has not rebutted the prima facie showing that his A1for.d plea was 
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made 
b. Persistent Violator Charge 
Hartshor11 appears to argue his Alford plea was coerced. He states: "The 
defendant, in the above mentioned cause, after pre-trial discussio~ls ~vi th  the defense 
lawyer and prosecuter, was told that if he didn't plead guilty to grand theft he was to be 
charged with the persistent violator." h4, to Withdraw Alford Plea at 2. 
In Stone I: State, 108 Idaho 822, 824-25, 702 P.2d 860, 862-63 (Ct. App. 1?85), 
the Ida110 Court of Appeals held: 
Stone . . . alleges that the prosecutor tlweatened to charge Stone as 
an habitual offender and represented that an additional twenty-six coullts 
could be filed in federal court if he did not plead guilty. Stone, however; 
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does not allege that these additional charges were groundless, only that 
they were not filed. It is clear from the record that Stone was aware his 
prior felony convictions made it possible for him to be charged by the 
state as a persistent violator and to receive a life sentence. See I.C. 5 19- 
2514. He thus does not contend that the prosecutor's conduct was 
fraudulent. A prosecutor is at liberty to use the availability of filing 
additional, legitimate charges as a bargaining chip in plea negotiations. 
"A guilty plea induced by a prosecutorial ... pronlise to refrain from filing 
additional charges does not necessarily vitiate an otl~erwise voluntary 
j'lea." State 11. S~)irzdell, 93 Wasl1.2d 192, 607 P.2d 852, 855 (1980). 
"Defendants advised by competent counsel and protected by other 
procedural safeguards are presumptively capable of i~ltelligent choice in 
response to prosecutorial persuasion, and unlikely to be driven to false 
self-condenmation." Bordelzkir-cher v. Hajm, 434 U.S. 357, 363. 98 S.Ct. 
663. 668, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978). Stone admits his counsel was present 
when the "threats" were made. He does not allege any other facts which 
would cast a shado\v on the voluntariness of his guilty plea. Stone was 
thus "presumptively capable of intelligent choice in response to 
prosecutorial persuasion." He has therefore not alleged facts which. even 
if true, would entitle him to relief. See Cooper v. State, supra. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has also stated: 
[Tlhere is a certain amount of coercion inherent in charging a defendant 
and bringing him before the court to declare his guilt or innocence. 
During plea bargaining, there is little chance of constitutionally excessive 
coercion, however, so long as the defendant is free to accept or reject the 
prosecutor's offers. 
Gar-zee 11. State, 126 Idaho 396, 399, 883 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Ct. App. 1994). 
The prosecutor in this case was free to use the "threat" of a persistent violator 
charge as a persuasive tool when negotiating the plea bargain with Hartshorn. I-Iartshorn 
was represented by counsel and protected by various procedural safeguards. He was free 
to accept or reject the prosecutor's offers. Ha~-tshorn's Alford plea is, therefore, presunled 
to have been entered voluntarily. 
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2. Factual basis inquiry 
I-lal-tshorn argues the court's acceptance of his plea was improper because the 
court "did not inquire fully to the facts of the charge." M. to Withdra\v Alford Plea at 
conti~lued page 2 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has explained that with an Alfo7.d plea, not only nlust 
the plea be voluntal-ily, knowingly and intelligently made, but a fourth requirement must 
also be met: 
[Aln accused may volunlarily conse~lt to the inlposition of a prison 
se~ltence despite a professed belief in his or her i~mocence, as long as a 
factual basis for the plea is denlonstrated by the state, and the accused 
clearly expresses a desire to enter such a plea. In Idaho, there is 110 
general obligation to inquire into the factual basis of a guilty plea. 
However, such an inquiry should be made if an Alford plea is accepted. or 
if the court receives information before sentencing wl~ich raises an 
obvious doubt as to guilt. 
Arnersor7 v. State, 1 19 Idaho 994, 996, 8 12 P.2d 301, 303 (Ct. App. 1991) (citations 
omitted). 
During the December 4, 2006, arraignment, the Court inquired into the factual 
basis of the grand theft charge against Hartshorn: 
Judge St. Clail-: And how about the last case-this grand theft charge. 
What happened there? 
Hal-tshorn: I had 1nj7 business. It was wllen I first started my business. A 
guy that was working with me; I needed to get some stuff off the internet 
and sell them. Supposedly his girlfriend's mother, which I've never met 
her, got a debit card. I paid 330 or 350 buclts. Ordered what I needed to 
order and that was all it was used. I got burglarized and we thought that 
that \vas stolen too. T11e card was supposed to have been just used the one 
time and then I was told it wasn't any good after that. Well, anyway 1 had 
it in my safe and they stole my safe, so I figured that was gone with it. 
Later when we moved out of the shop I found it. I put it in my wallet and 
that's where it's been. I don't kllow. I've been in and out of Jail four or 
five tinles in the last year and nobody ever said anything until this time. 
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Stafford: Your honor, on this one we should probably do Alford, I thinli. 
He's disputing that he stole it. but the owner of the card is claillling that 
she didn't give him pernlission that to use it or have it so it's kind of a 
factual dispute. I think he's agreeing to plead guilty for the benefits of this 
plea agreenlent, getting the othel- charges dismissed. and due to the risk at 
trial with her c o n ~ i ~ l g  in and saying that he didn't have perlnission to have 
it. 
Judge St. Clair: Is that right h4r. Na~-tshorn? 
Hartshorn: Yes, sir. 
Judge St. Clair: And so you think that this Cheryl Beverland that she 
would be testieing against you with respect to this particular card? 
Hartshorn: I guess so. She said it happened a year ago. It's been nlore 
like two-and-a-half years ago. 
Judge St. Clair: But you had it? You had her card in your wallet? 
Hartshorn: Yes, I did. 
Judge St. Clair: Mihen you were here in Idaho Falls, Idaho? 
Hartshorn: Yes. 
Judge St. Clair: On October 26, 2006? 
Hartshorn: Yes. 
Judge St. Clair: You didn't have any per~llission from her to have her 
card in your wallet? 
Hartshorn: No. 
Transcribed by Court. 
The Court's inquiry into the factual basis for the grand theft charge against 
Ha~-tshorn was sufficient to establish a basis for Hartshorn's AlJbrd plea. 
3. Specific Intent 
Hartshor~~ argues he was never "told that the state had the burden of proving 
intent.'' M. to MJithdraw A1for.d Plea at continued page 3. He cites Srnle 1,. Henderson. 
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1 1  3 Idaho 41 1 ,  744 P.2d 795 (Ct. App. 1957), in support of his al-gument that he should 
have been informed that the state had the burden of proving intent. In He17der.sol7: the 
defendant argued the trial court erred u/hen it denied his ~notioll to withdraw guilty plea. 
I-Ienderson based his motion to withdraw guilty plea on the grounds he had not been 
infonlled. prior to entering the guilty plea, that the state needed to prove specific intent as 
an elenle~ll of grand theft. The Court of Appeals stated: 
Before accepting a guilty plea, the caul-t lllust satisfi itself that the 
plea is offered v o l ~ ~ n t a r i l ~ ~ ,  lu~o~vingly and intelligently. I .C.R. 1 1 (c): 
Fo~~vler. v. State, 109 Idaho 1002, 712 P.2d 703 (Ct.App.1985). A 
voluntary plea cannot be 111ade without disclosure to the accused of the 
intent element of a specific illtent crime. Syarr.ol.ri 1). State, 102 Idaho 60, 
625 P.2d 414 (1 98 1); Folder 1). Slate, supra; State 1). Trasquez, 107 Idaho 
1052,695 P.2d 437 (Ct.App. 1985). 
We must examine the rec,ord of the proceedings at which the guilty 
plea was talcen and the record of prior proceedings to deternline \vllether 
the accused was adequately informed of the specific intent element. . . . 
. . . Grand theft is a specific intent crime. 
As we have shown, the infoll~lation itself did not specifically 
~nentioll an intent to deprive or an intent to defraud. It did not allege that 
Henderson lu~ew or had reason to know- that the cashier's checlts were 
false and forged and ~vould not be paid when presented. Nothing in the 
record shows that, when the guilty plea was entered. Henderson had been 
told that if the case went to trial the state would have to prove the specific 
intent and knowledge required for a conviction under this statute. ITrhat 
Henderson's trial counsel may have told Henderson about elenlents of 
proof or possible defenses is not shown. 
Id. at 412-413, 744 P.2d at 796-97. The court held Henderson must be permitted 
to withdraw his guilty plea. 
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111 this case, the State filed an anlended inforn~ation accusing Hal-tshorn of Grand 
Theft on November 28, 2006. The amended information reads: 
COUNT I, GRAND THEFT, Felony 
I.C. $5 18-2403,18-2407(1)(b)3 
The defendant, CURTIS GLENN HARTSHORN, on or about October 26, 
2006, in Bonneville County. State of Idaho, did wrongfully take. obtain, or 
witllhold a financial transaction card from the owner, Cheryl Beverland, 
with the intent to deprive the owner of such property or to appropriate the 
same to himself. (14 years, $5, OOOfine. c/nd restitution ) 
(Underlined emphasis added). 
During the December 4, 2006, arraig~ul~ent, Hal-ts1101-n and Judge St. Clair 
engaged in the f o l l o ~ ~ i n g  dialogue: 
Judge St. Clair: h4r. Ha~-tshom did you get a copy of the infornlation in 
these t h e e  cases that describes the charges? 
Hartshorn: Yes. I did. 
Judge St. Clair: Did you read the infornlations? 
Hartshorn: Yeah, I did. 
Judge St. Clair: You have the right to have me read them to you out loud 
here in court. lrould you like rile to read them? 
Hartshorn: No, sir 
Unlike in Henderson, Ha~-tshorn was advised by the specific language of the 
amended infornlation that intent was a required elenlent of grand theft. Consequentl~~, his 
Alford plea was made voluntarily, lu~o\vingly and intelligently. 
B. Motion to Reconsider 
Hartsho~il filed an objection to the Court's September 20. 2007, Menlora~ldunl 
Decision Re: Motions for Credit for Time Served. This Court assunles Ha1-tshor11 intends 
his objection as a motion for reconsideration. In suppo~t of his h4otion for Credit for 
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Time Served, Hartshorn cites State 1). Her-~zandez. 120 Idaho 785, 820P.2d 3 80, for the 
propositio~l that a defendant \\rho receives credit for time served 011 one charge should be 
credited with an equal amount oftime served on all other charges being served 
c o ~ l c ~ ~ ~ r e n t l y  wi h the first charge. I-Iartshon~ states: 
If all sentences are ru~lning concul~ent except for the escape 
charge, shouldn't I get 321 days jail credit on all charges that run 
concurrent to 111y origi~lal sentence? The consecutive one year fixed for 
escape with 1 13 days to begin after the original sentence inlposed is ho\?l it 
should be. 
Aff. of Defendant at attaclmlellt #2. Hartshorn appears to be arguing that he should 
receil~e 321 days credit on Cases No. CR-06-17236 and CR-06-19594. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Slate v. Tfasquez, 142 Idaho 
67, 133 P.3d 1 167 (Ct. App. 2005). In Thsqtlez, the defendant was arrested for 
possession of a controlled substance in Payette County. One month later, Vasquez was 
s e r ~ ~ e d  with an arrest warrallt from Washington County while still incarcerated in Payette 
County. Vasquez was se~ltellced in Payette County on July 10, 2003. On the sanle day, 
Vasquez was transported to IATashington County and arsaigned on the charges pending 
against him there. He was sentenced in Washington County 011 August 11, 2003. The 
Washington County sentences were ordered to run concurrently with the Payette County 
sentence. Vasquez received credit for the thirty-two days he sei-ved in Washington 
County on the Washington County sentence. He filed a motion for credit for tinle served 
arguing that because the sentences were ordered to run concurrently, he was entitled to 
psejudgment credit on his Washington County sentence for the time served in Payette 
Coullty. 
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The could in T/clsqz.lez stated: 
The award of credit for time served is governed by 1.C. 4 18-309 
\vhich provides in part: 
In conlputing the term of imprisolxnent, the person against whom 
the judgnlent was entered, shall receive credit in the judgnlent for 
any period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment. if such 
incarceration was for the offense or an included offense for which 
the j udg~nent was entered. 
The statute's phase  "if such incarceration was for the offense or 
an included offense for which the judgment was entered" means that the 
right to credit is conferred only if the prejudgmellt incarceration is a 
consequence of or attributable to the charge or conduct for which the 
sentence is imposed. State v. Horn, 124 Idaho 849, 850. 865 P.2d 176, 
177 (Ct.App.1993); Hale, 116 Idaho at 765, 779 P.2d at 440. Thus. there 
must be a causal effect between the offense and the incarceration in order 
for the incarceration to be "for'' the offense, as the tern1 is used in I.C. 4 
18-309. 
Id. at 68, 122 P.3d at 1168. 
The J/irsquez court distinguished Hernarzdez, explaining: 
There is a distillction between the defendant in Herrzarzdez and the 
defendant in Horn and Vasquez, namely that Hernandez was charged in 
one county under one multi-count indictment, whereas Vasquez and Horn 
were charged for crimes in different counties on separate c.omplaints for 
unrelated acts. When charges are concurrently filed, the prejudgnlent 
incarceratioll is caused by each charge. On the other hand, when the 
charges are not concurrently filed but rather brought by different 
complaints for unrelated charges in separate counties, the incarceratioll is 
not a consequence of all charges even if the sentences. are subsequently 
ordered to run concul~ently. In short, a defendant wrongfully receives 
duplicative credit for prejudg~nent incarceratio~l when the incarceration is 
credited to each concurre~lt sentence but is attributable to only one charge 
and not the other. 
. . . [Tlhe fact that Vasquez was given the benefit of concurrent sentences 
does not nlean that he gets the additional benefit of prejudgn~ellt 
incarceration attributable to a colnpletely separate crime comnlitted in 
another county. 
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Id at 69, 132 P.3d at 11 69. 
In this case. Ha~lshorn pled guilty and was se~ltenced on four unrelated chal-ges. 
His prejudgment incarceration in Cases No. CR-06-17236 and CR-06-19594 was not 
related to his prejudgnlent incarceration in Case No. CR-06-5769. The Court gave 
Hartshorn the benefit of allo\ving hi111 to serve his time for the t h e e  separate cases 
concurrently. Hartshorn is not. however, entitled to apply the credit he received for time 
served only under Case No. CR-06-5769 to Cases No. CR-06-17236 and CR-06-19594. 
Hal-tshorn also argues T'asquez is distinguishable from his case because Vasquez 
was charged in different counties, whereas he was charged only in Bo~u le~~ i l l e  County. 
Hartsl~onl nlisinterprets Tiasquez. The focus of the court's holding in J'nsqzre; 
was that a defendant does not receive the benefit of credit for time served on concurrent 
sentences when his prejudglnent incarceration for one of the charges was "attributable to 
a con~pletely separate crime.'' The fact Vasquez's charges were filed in separate counties 
is not relevant. The fact the charges in Hartshon~l's cases were brought by different 
conlplaints and for unrelated charges provides the basis for application of the J'asques 
decision in this action. 
The Court's Septenlber 20, 2007. memora~~dum decision correctly denied 
Hartshorn's motions for credit for time served. Hartshonl" motioll for reconsideration 
should be denied. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Hartshorn's ~l lot io~l  to withdraw Alfol-d plea should be denied. 
Hartshorn's lllotio11 for reconsideration should be denied. 
.,- h 
DATED this L C  day of March 2008. 
_ % L L ' ~ G ~  .i C>,~'ILWU-L 
GREGORY S. ANDERSON 
District Judge 
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1 hereby certify that on this c>, day of March 2008. I did send a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing docume~lt upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the 
correct postage thereon; by causing the saine to be placed in the respective cousthouse 
mailbox; or by causing the saine to be hand-delivered. 
Cul-tis Glenn Hartshonl 
ISCI Unit 14 
Post Office Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
Bo1lne\7ille County Prosecutor's Office 
605 N. Capital Ave. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bo~uleville County. Idaho 
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